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NOTES
PHANTOM TRADEMARKS: GOOD LAW OR
CHAIN RATTLING? THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS
OF STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE
LANDHAM ACT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES DECISION
I. INRODUCTION
The issue of Phantom Trademarks was one of first impression in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the case of In re International
Flavors and Fragrances.1 As its name suggests, International Flavors and
Fragrances (1F is a producer of flavor and fragrance essences for use in a
variety of food and chemical products.2 This litigation was prompted when
IFF submitted three trademark applications to the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).3 These marks included "LIVING XXXX FLAVORS,"
"LIVING XXXX FLAVOR," and "LIVING XXXX," and were intended to
protect a large number of individual products produced by IFF.4 For
example, IFF intended its "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" to cover a number
of flavors or scents of herbs, fruits, plants or vegetables, with the "XXXX"
notation simply standing in place of the desired product.'
The applications were rejected by the PTO, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, and finally by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.6 The reasoning of these bodies was that the marks
submitted by IFF were known as "Phantom Trademarks," a term of art,
In re International Flavors and Fragrances, 183 F.3d 1361,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir.,
1999).
2 Id at 1361.
Ii
International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1361.
1
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based on their intended use to protect more marks than those actually
presented on the applications! This served as the basis of the court's final
rejection of the applicant's proposed marks!
The court, under a de novo review standard, heard IFF's appeal from the
decision of the PTO review board and rejected IFF's contentions that the
marks were sufficient to warrant registration.9 The court noted, among
other reasons, that the marks would be essentially too difficult for future
applicants to find when researching potential marks, since the full marks as
used in commerce would not be on the trademark registry in their entireties,
but rather would be variations on the framework-style marks proposed by
IFF in its applications.1" Therefore, the court affirmed the Board's
assessment and rejected IFF's trademark applications.
The purpose of this Note is to explore the issue of trademarks dubbed
"Phantom Trademarks" by the PTO. The discussion will focus on the case
of In re International Flavors & Fragrances,12 as it provided a matter of first
impression in the Federal Circuit." The central issue for discussion here,
however, is the argument that the Court was incorrect in its interpretation
of the law concerning these marks. As noted in the principle case, this is an
issue that was one of first impression in the Federal Circuit, which leaves
very little precedent from which to draw as to the central issue. Thus, in
order to properly resolve this issue, one must look to precedent regarding the
collateral concepts which comprise the subject of trademarks and trademark
registration for guidance as to the proper resolution of this issue.
Additionally, the historical basis, practical implications, and legislative
history function to fill the remaining voids and provide the framework
necessary to paint a full image of this issue and inform the reader of the
current state of affairs in trademark law. Consequently, this consideration
will extend further to the resulting implications on the successful




0 Id at 1366-67.
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PHANTOM TRADEMARKS
I. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES, INC.:
ITS BUSINESS, ITS CONTENTIONS, AND THE RESPONSE
OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. THE BACKGROUND AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND
FRAGRANCES
International Flavors and Fragrances is a New York corporation which
produces flavor and fragrance oils for use in finished products such as foods,
tobacco, chewing gum, oral care products, beverages, colognes, cosmetics,
toiletries, laundry care products, and air fresheners.1" As IFF produces a vast
array of individual essences, it sought to protect its entire line of similar
products through the use of three blanket applications, in which the
"XXXX" symbol was intended to represent the name of the particular flavor
or fragrance essence used in each individual product."5 The intent of this was
that all such essences would thereby be protected against misappropriation
by other manufacturers by a single, standard trademark.
The first applications were rejected by the examining attorney because the
specimens submitted did not contain an "XXXX" element.16 IFF then
entered disclaimers for the terms 'FLAVOR' and 'FLAVORS, '"7 stating that
it made no claim to the use of those terms outside the context of the mark
as shown in the applications. 8 Furthermore, IFF amended the applications
to indicate that the "XXXX" symbol was not part of the mark, but rather an
undefined term representative of the specific flavor and essence names to be
inserted in the mark's framework.' 9 The Board nevertheless denied the
applications, noting that the issue regarding the technical uses of those terms
14 Id.
"' Id These applications, designated "LIVING XXXX FLAVORS," "LIVING )CXXX FLAVOR,"
and "LIVING XXXX," were intended to cover all essences, with each of the three marks designed to
protect a particular type of essence. 'LIVING XXXX FLAVORS" and "LIVING XXX FLAVOR"
sought to protect essences for use in food products, with "LIVING GREEN BELL PEPPER FLAVORS,"
"LIVING STRAWBERRY FLAVOR," and "LIVING CILANTRO FLAVOR" submitted as the
specimens showing the use of the marks. 'LIVING XXXX" sought to protect primarily botanical extracts
for use in personal toiletries, perfumes, and laundry care products, with "LIVING FLOWERS," "LIVING
MINT," -LIVING FRAGRANCE," "LIVING FRUIT," "LIVING OSMANTHUS," and "LIVING
RASPBERRY" submitted as specimens with the application.
16 International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1361.
17 Id
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was actually secondary to the fact that the "applicant wishe[d] to protect, in
three registrations, ... an unknown number of marks." 0 While there is no
official policy governing the ability to register "Phantom Trademarks," the
basis of the Board's findings is that the intent of trademark applications is to
"place all on notice of the precise mark(s) being sought to be registered."2
The court further agreed with the Board that future applicants must be able
to perform a reasonable search of the trademark records when attempting to
determine their ability to register their own marks.2 Permitting IFF to
register its "phantom" marks would make doing so nearly impossible.23
B. IFF'S CONTENTIONS BEFORE THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, AND THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
IFF contends that the Review Board's refusal to register its trademarks
deprives it of a property interest in the marks without due process of law, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.24
Furthermore, IFF argues that the Board has issued similar marks in the past
and continues to do so, 2 and that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
has no statutory basis for granting or denying "phantom" marks.
In response to these contentions, the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks informed IFF in his report that IFF had tried to register a
potentially unlimited number of marks by means of the three applications
at issue.26 This practice is prohibited by the Lanham Act, which requires
that a trademark applicant may only register a single mark in any one
application, known as the "One-mark-per-application" Rule.28 Furthermore,
IFF's applications are for use-based marks, but the applications are written
in such broad terms that not all of the potential variations of the marks
" In re Intl Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1317 (May 19, 1998) (the published




24 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
s International Flavors &Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
26 Id at 1314.
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PHANTOM TRADEMARKS
covered by the "phantom" elements are in use. 9 The result of this type of
registration would be that if the marks were granted, it would be impossible
for the public to determine precisely what was covered by the marks. This
would give inadequate notice of unavailable trademarks to the public, when
adequate notice is a primary objective of trademark registration under the
current system. Finally, the Commissioner addressed IFF's Due Process
claim by stating that all of IFF's contentions were duly addressed in
accordance with PTO procedures, and that IFF had the opportunity to
respond to all of the PTO's actions and findings."
In response to IFF's contention that the PTO had issued similar marks in
the past, the Commissioner stated that PTO findings concerning prior
applications do not serve as precedent binding on subsequent applications."
Therefore, IFF could not rely on them as a basis for challenging the Board's
findings. Each application is taken on its own merits in accordance with
PTO policy,32 and thus IFF was unable to use these alleged prior applications
to demonstrate that the PTO discriminated against it in denying its
applications.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND
FRAGRANCES' CLAIMS, AND WHY ITS RULING WAS IN ERROR
The Court's analysis relied primarily on the Lanham Act requirement
that an application seek to register only a single mark. The Court cited 37
C.F.R. §2.51(a)(1) (1998), which states that "In an application under section
1(a) of the [Lanham] Act, the drawing of the trademark shall be a
substantially exact representation of the mark as used on or in connection
with the goods. . ." Furthermore, the Court relied on the PTO's own
regulations and guidelines, which provide substantially the same
requirements for registration of a trademark.




" U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §807 (2d ed. 1993
rev. 1.1 Aug. 1997) ("[Tlhere may not be more than one mark on a drawing, since an application must be
limited to one mark."). Other courts have also regarded the PTO guidelines as decisive. See also Critikon,
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson VascularAccess, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1669 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (Tl]he Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).. . does not have the force of law,
[but] is well known to those registered to practice in the PTO and reflects the presumptions under which
2000]
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The simple reasoning behind this holding is based on the policy
implications underlying the federal registration of trademarks. While
registration of a mark affords a variety of benefits and protections to the
owner,34 it also provides a service to entrepreneurs and existing businesses
who may wish to register their own marks, by allowing them to rely on a
search of the records of the Trademark Office to determine which marks
they may or may not claim for their own products. The court recognized
the primary purpose of the Trademark Act of 1946 in its opinion in
Bongrain International Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., by recognizing that
[tihe primary purpose of the Trademark Act of 1946 is to
give Federal procedural augmentation to the common law
rights of trademark owners-which is to say legitimate users
of trademarks. One of the policies sought to be
implemented by the Act was to encourage the presence on
the register of trademarks of as many as possible of the
marks in actual use so that they are available for search
p.rposes.3"
This public benefit extends to all consumers of established products, as it
allows these consumers to rely on the marks as a symbol of the quality they
expect from certain producers, prevents confusion among competing
products, and prevents other producers from passing off inferior products by
appropriating another's trademark for their own benefit.
The court continued its explanation by stating that the public benefits of
trademark registration rely on the proper functioning of the established
system. Thus, IFF's attempt to register "phantom" marks could cause a
breach in this system if allowed to proceed, as allowing the registration
would prevent other hopeful registrants from effectively searching the
the PTO operates.).
" Even without registration of a trademark, the owner of a mark has a property right established by
prior use. This allows the owner to use his mark in commerce and prevent others from using it without
permission. Once the mark achieves federal registration, infringement claims may be litigated in a federal
court, and the rightful owner may seek costs, treble damages, attorney's fees, the destruction of infringing
goods, and prevention of the importation of infringing goods.
's Bongrain Int'l Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479,1485,1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775,1779
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that there is no likelihood of confusion between two marks that have some
similarities but that are dissimilar when viewed as a whole and in the contexts in which they are used).
[Vol. 8:53
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trademark records. This would likely result in an uncertain degree of
disorder in the marketplace, and thus should not be permitted to occur.
While iFF argued that it should have been permitted to register its
"phantom" marks based on prior registrations allowed by the PTO,36 the
rules used by the PTO in making these determinations may cause some
friction within the issue. The section of the Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure (TMEP) regarding drawings37 explains precisely what
is required for an application to be reviewed by a trademark examiner. This
section states the specific rules regarding the drawing requirement of a
trademark application."
36 International Fla ors, 183 F.3d at 1365.
U7 nited States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Proc. S 807 (Carlisle
E. Walters ed., 1st ed. 1986).
" Id The drawing is the part of the application which presents the elements which constitute the
mark sought to be registered. A drawing is required for all marks other than sound marks and scent
marks.... For search purposes, copies of the drawing are filed in the Trademark Search Library and the
mark and all relevant information is entered into the Office's automated search system.
The drawing requirements are strictly enforced (citation omitted). Materials
submitted as an application must include a drawing which conforms to the rules or
they will not be accorded a filing date (citation omitted).
Examining attorneys must require applicants to comply promptly with the
drawing rules. Requests to defer drawing corrections until such time as the
application is approved for publication or registration should be denied.
If an applicant submits two or more drawings displaying different marks or
different versions of a mark, the application materials will be denied a filing date
(citation omitted). Trademark Rule 2.21 (a)(3), 37 C.F.R. S2.21 (a)(3), requires
submission of "A drawing." Therefore, an application including two or more
drawings displaying different marks will not be accorded a filing date.
The mark on the drawing must be a complete mark, as evidenced by the
specimens, if applicable. The representation on a drawing of matter which does not
constitute a complete mark has sometimes been referred to as "mutilation." This
term indicates that essential and integral subject matter is missing from the drawing
(citation omitted).
In an application filed under S 1 (a) of the Trademark Act, the drawing of the mark
shall be a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on or in connection
with the goods or services, as shown by the specimens (citations omitted).
In an application filed under S I(b) of the Act,'the drawing of the mark shall be
a substantially exact representation of the mark as intended to be used and as actually
used on or in connection with the goods or services as shown by the specimens, once
an amendment to allege use... or a statement of use . .. has been filed (citation
omitted).
.Typed drawings" are not drawn at all-the mark is written by using the
typewriter-but they are referred to as "drawings" because they perform the function
7
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The Court in IFF's situation aptly noted that, in order to make
constructive notice meaningful, the mark
must accurately reflect the way it is used in commerce so
that someone who searches the registry for the mark, or a
similar mark, will locate the registered mark. 'Phantom'
marks with missing elements, especially those sought to be
registered by IFF, encompass too many combinations and
permutations to make a thorough and effective search
possible. 9
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in its opinion relied on the Federal
Circuit's opinion in In re ECCS, Inc. as decisive on this topic.' In that case,
ECCS, Inc. ("EGGS") submitted an application for a mark already used in
commerce, designated as "EXA MODULE," with the "EXA" component
placed on the line above the "MODULE" component. The drawing on the
trademark application depicted the mark as "EXAMODULE," as one word
on one line. The review board rejected the application as an attempt to
register a mark that was unlike that shown to have been used in commerce.
The Federal Circuit agreed with this finding, and held that under section 1(a)
of the Lanham Act,4 the drawing of the trademark must be a substantially
exact representation of the mark as used on or in connection with the goods.
Thus, the drawing submitted with the application was defective in that it
differed from the specimens.42 While the Board's decision not to allow
registration of the mark was reversed on the grounds that ECCS attempted
to revise the drawing to conform with the specimens it had submitted, its
of a drawing. A typed drawing may be used for a mark which comprises 'only a
word, letter or numeral, or any combination thereof, not depicted in special form.'
(citation omitted).
Intent-to-use applicants, like all other applicants, must comply with all formal
requirements related to drawings, whether typed or in special form.
I
" International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368.
o 94 F.3d 1578, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing holding that a specimen
submitted as an example of the way a trademark is to be used in commerce must conform to the drawing
on the actual trademark application, and noncompliance with this provision will result in refusal of
registration by the PTO).
4' Lanham Act Si(a), 15 U.S.C. S 1051(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
'2 ECCS, 94 F.3d at 1579.
[Vol. 8:53
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holding that the drawing must be a substantially exact representation of the
mark sought to be registered remains a good statement of the applicable law.
In IFF's situation, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on this requirement,
as IFF had failed to include specimens of the marks it sought to register,
except for its use of "XXXX" to designate an undefined number of products.
This type of registration was deemed unacceptable by the court in light of
the policy concerns of allowing other would-be registrants to rely on the
validity and completeness of the PTO records when deciding which marks
to register for themselves. Had IFF amended the applications to reflect
specific marks with supporting specimens, the court would not likely have
rejected its applications. However, had IFF done this, it would only have
succeeded in registering and therefore protecting three marks, pursuant to
the one mark per application rule maintained by the court. As IFF sought
to register and protect all of its products through three single applications,
such a course of action would not have served its purpose. Thus, IFF was
left to begin the lengthy process of registering each of its proposed marks on
separate applications.
1. The One Mark Per Application Rule. The court used the attempted
registration of a color for use on a product as a hypothetical situation for
explaining why an application must clearly show exactly what is sought to
be registered. 3 Similarly, IFF used the "XXXX" symbol to designate an
unknown number of flavors and fragrances to be used in its products (some
of which may not have even been invented or formulated yet). Thus, this
lack of specificity in the application would not allow a future applicant to
know what marks it could or could not use, just as another producer of farm
equipment would not know what types of products it could use its desired
shade of blue on without knowledge of the original manufacturer's intended
uses. Thus, the court's decision affirms the objective of maintaining market
stability through full knowledge of what may or may not be used as a future
trademark. The court has gone too far here, however, because IFF's
situation deals more with the tractor than with its color. The basis of this
43 The court's hypothetical example involved a producer of farm equipment attempting to register
the color blue as a trademark for use on its tractors and other farming implements. In such a situation,
the applicant would be required to submit a drawing of a tractor, for example, colored in the shade of blue
sought to serve as the mark. If the applicant merely submitted an application with a swatch of the color
drawn in a box and labeled for use in its products, with types and quantities to be determined at a later
time, the uncertain products would be considered a "phantom" element and the application would be
rejected for lack of specificity.
20001
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argument is that the undetermined components of IFF's proposed marks,
designated in its marks with the "XXXX" notation, are basically generic,
unprotectable terms. IFF sought to protect the design of its mark, rather
than the use of the variable flavors, and thus it contended that it should not
have been required to deal with each of those names individually.
2. Likelihood of Confusion. The court considered its concern over
problems of likelihood of confusion when discussing the requirement of a
complete rendition of the mark to be protected." In doing so, the court
relied on its decision in In re National Data Corporation ("National Data").4"
In that case National Data sought to register the mark "THE CASH
MANAGEMENT EXCHANGE" on the principle register as a service
mark, but its application was denied as being substantially similar to the
mark "CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT," registered approximately
eighteen months earlier by another company.46 The PTO rejected the
application based on the similarity of the marks and the likelihood of
confusion if the marks were both used in commerce.47 The court held that
[t]he basic principle in determining confusion between
marks is that marks must be compared in their entireties and
must be considered in connection with the particular goods
or services for which they are used.... It follows from that
principle that likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated
on dissection of a mark, that is, on only part of a mark.4"
The court then concluded by noting that more or less weight may be
given to a particular feature of a mark when determining substantial
similarity or likelihood of confusion, as long as the ultimate conclusion rests
on consideration of the marks in their entireties.49
4I International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368.
In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4611
' i at 1057. In that case, the court deemed the term "cash management" to be descriptive, and thus
not subject to protection. National Data entered a disclaimer that "cash. management" could be
descriptive, but maintained its argument that when combined with "EXCHANGE" it formed a distinct
mark, because "cash management" was the only descriptive part. The court rejected this contention,
holding that the two marks were confusingly similar, because the dominant feature, "cash management,"
was the same.
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Similarly, IFF sought to register a mark that included a
generic/descriptive component and a creative, new component. As the court
aptly noted, IFF's definition of the "phantom" elements in its applications
is broad enough to include any plant, fruit, vegetable, or herb." For
example, if a subsequent applicant sought to register a mark with the same
flavor or scent as the would-be IFF mark, the court would contend that he
may be prevented from doing so simply because the name of the fragrance
would be substantially similar to the IFF mark and pose a likelihood of
confusion. The court would likely contend that if the IFF marks were
granted registration, they could potentially serve as bars to registration of
any other mark that contained the name of any plant, herb, fruit, or
vegetable used by IFF in its products. Obviously, this type of restriction on
registration of other marks, and the problems it could cause for future
registrants, far outweighs any benefits that may be found by allowing the
registration. However, this contention by the court is inappropriate for this
situation, as IFF clearly did not seek to protect its use of plant, herb, and
other names, but only the framework of its chosen mark.
The court contends that the applicable statutory provisions and relevant
case law, taken in conjunction with the rules contained in the TMEP, st
clearly demonstrate that IFF had plenty of guidance when preparing its
applications to register its "Living" marks. The requirement of clear,
unambiguous drawings that are exactly the same as the specimens sought to
be accorded trademark protection is conclusive evidence that the type of
shortcut that IFF attempted to take will not be tolerated by the PTO. Thus,
should IFF seek to protect all of its marks in the future, it will be required
to pursue the painstaking process of registering separately each of the
individual flavors and fragrances it produces. The court would likely further
contend that, while on its face this process seems to be a rather burdensome
requirement, it is necessary to protect the higher purpose of the current
trademark system: providing sufficient notice of existing marks to
entrepreneurs and others who wish to register new trademarks. This
requirement thereby maintains the market stability effected by certainty of
registry and ownership of existing trademarks.
"International Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
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While the position taken by the trademark examiners and the court is
certainly compelling, the argument must be presented that IFF and other
would-be registrants of "phantom" trademarks should not be required to
bear the financially costly and time-consuming burden of registering
hundreds of trademarks when all will have exactly the same basic form. The
only variation among them is the interchangeable generic names of fruits,
herbs, vegetables, and plants. The court in National Data2 argued that a
mark must be taken as a whole, without disclaiming the generic parts, when
it denied National Data's application to use the "Cash Management
Exchange" mark based on the prior registration of the "Cash Management
Account" mark. National Data attempted to stipulate that "Cash
Management" was generic and that it only wished to register that phrase
based on its use with the word "Exchange," thus creating a different mark
than that previously registered. This holding is arguably correct, since the
two marks, when viewed side by side, would be quite similar and thus
potentially lead to confusion.
If one were to apply this argument to slightly different circumstances,
however, a different outcome may seem appropriate. Consider the following
hypothetical situation: IFF successfully registers one of its marks-"Living
Orange Flavor." Subsequently, a hypothetical competitor-Hometown
Flavor Factory (HFF)-in the flavor and fragrance business wishes to register
a new trademark for its citrus line of fragrances, and its research suggests that
"Living Citrus Flavor" will be a catchy, memorable mark that will help to
increase consumer awareness and develop substantial goodwill toward its
product. When it researches the trademark registry to determine if anyone
else holds a similar mark, it would no doubt find IFF's mark and be forced
to look for another mark. If it tried to register the mark anyway, as
National Data did for its proposed mark, it would likely be denied
registration, because "Living Citrus Flavor" is as similar to "Living Orange
Flavor" as "Cash Management Exchange" is to "Cash Management Account"
when the two are held side by side.
Now consider HFF's next step: It decides to put its citrus flavor on hold
and go for something completely different, and thus begins production of its
new line of garlic products. Still hoping to use the mark it chose for its
citrus line, HFF seeks to register the mark "Living Garlic Flavor." Certainly
's In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 8:53
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this mark will be rejected as well, since it is still almost exactly the same as
IFF's "Living Orange Flavor" mark, even though it changed the generic term
to something completely different. Obviously, it is the mark taken as a
whole that serves as the mode of comparison, and thus any mark in the form
of "Living XXXX Flavor" presented to the PTO will be rejected as being
confusingly similar to IFF's mark.
So why, then, is IFF required to painstakingly register each of its marks
on a separate application, when anyone else who tried to do so would, at
least in theory, be denied registration on the grounds of substantial
similarity? The court reasoned that each mark must be registered to allow
subsequent entrepreneurs to easily search the system for marks already
registered and thus ensure continued market stability through protecting
goodwill associated with particular marks, avoiding confusion, and
protecting the benefits that owners enjoy from federal registration."3 But if
a subsequent entrepreneur like HFF searched the records to see if "Living
Garlic Flavor" had been claimed already, he would most certainly stumble
across IFF's "Living Orange Flavor" trademark in the process. HFF could
substitute an innumerable quantity of flavors in its application, but all would
likely be denied as being substantially similar to IFF's mark. This
contention would seem to minimize the risk, which the court relied on so
heavily, of searchers having to scour the registry for infinite permutations of
plant, herb, fruit, and vegetable names to see if their choices had been taken.
What, then, is left of this great concern when these fears are stripped away?
Consider one final permutation of this hypothetical situation:
HFF pulls its line of citrus products off the shelf to avoid tangling with
IFF, but clings to its hope that its quest for federal registration of these
products will soon come to fruition in another useful form. Returning to its
research for a new trademark, it decides "Vibrant Orange Tastes" is the next
best choice to the "Living" line of marks already owned by IFF. This mark
would seem to have a much greater chance of achieving registration with the
PTO, as it is nothing like the IFF mark, even in a side by side comparison,
except for the generic name of "orange" for its flavor. Here, both companies
would hold a trademark with "orange" in the name, but their marks would
still be different in each of the necessary respects. Clearly, this is seen in the
public marketplace with so many makers of orange-flavored beverages and
" International Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
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scented products. Additionally, it reaffirms the fact that, since each of these
manufacturers has likely secured a trademark for its product, the actual
designation of orange flavor, to follow the above hypothetical, is essentially
inconsequential when compared to the mark as a whole. Therefore, one
could argue that a generic, or perhaps even descriptive, term is not asimportant as the creative framework in which it is contained. If that were
true, then there would be no reason for 1FF to take the time to register each
of its marks by adding a distinct flavor or fragrance to the standard "LIVING
XXXX FLAVOR," -LIVING XXXX FLAVORS," and "LIVING XXXX"
frameworks. All future entrepreneurs would be on notice that these
frameworks and their close variations are protected, and thus the specific
type of flavor would be inconsequential to the purposes of trademark
registration discussed by the courts and the rules of examining procedure.
If that is the basis of the court's market stability analysis, why force EFF to
undertake the additional burden and expense of registering each mark
individually, when in actuality it really would hold only the three marks it
originally filed, but with a number of variations depending on what flavors
and fragrances it had in production at any given time?
Furthermore, if a survey were to be taken to determine which marks
consumers would group together as being owned by the same company in
its bundle of goodwill, it is possible that any marks that fit the "LIVING
XXXX FLAVOR," etc., frameworks would be put together, even if some of
them had never been introduced into commerce, since the recognition would
likely come from the standard form of the mark, rather than the particular
flavor or fragrance put in the center of it. If this contention holds true, then
there would be no satisfactory market-based justification for requiring IFF
to register each one of its flavors separately to receive federal protection.
The "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" framework would actually serve as the
true trademark with which consumers identify and on which goodwill is
built, with the actual flavors serving little purpose, if any at all. The
variations in flavors and fragrances placed within the framework would be
no different from a situation in which a trademark was printed in various
media, drawn sometimes in color and sometimes in black and white. That
situation would not change the validity of those printings that were a
different shade from the one originally registered, and all would receive
protection as the same mark, assuming the mark was not created dependent
on a specific color (such as John Deere green or United Parcel Service
[Vol. 8:53
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brownS'). Therefore, the generic, variable component of the mark is of little
importance, and thus IFF should not be required to register each of its
flavors individually as separate marks.
Following this line of argument, the court's requirement that IFF register
each of its marks separately may impose an undue burden of time and
expense on IFF.s5 If IFF were a new company and financially unable to meet
the obligation imposed by the court, would the court's decision serve as a
denial of IFF's property right in its trademarks? IFF thought so, as it
contended that the Board's decision deprived it of a property right without
due process of law.-' This claim is addressed below.
MTI. IFF's CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
In addition to IFF's claims that the marks it sought to register were valid
based on prior PTO registrations, IFF claimed that the PTO's denial of its
applications served as a denial of Due Process and Equal Protection under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 However, the Board correctly stated,
and the court properly upheld, that IFF was provided a full opportunity to
prosecute its applications and appeal the examining attorney's final
rejections.5 8 The Board affirmed the rejections in a full written opinion
setting forth each of its reasons supporting its decision. Specifically, the
court stated that IFF did not prove that it had a constitutionally protected
property interest in Federal registration of its marks, as there is no
constitutionally protected right to federal registration of any mark. 9
Furthermore, IFF may still enjoy all of its common law rights associated
with its use in commerce and the privileges derived from that use. IFF may
designate its marks as trademarks, but it will be denied the added protection
and nationwide notice of its claim of ownership that are conferred by federal
registration.
While IFF also contended that it was denied equal protection under the
law, the Board showed that each trademark application was considered on
'4 These are merely examples, and are not intended to reflect the actual trademark status of the colors
used by these corporations.
s International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1366.
'6 1aM at 1365.
U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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its own merits, and the reasons why these marks were rejected were provided
clearly and explicitly to IFF.' There is no PTO policy suggesting that an
applicant may rely on prior decisions when arguing for the acceptance of its
own mark." Therefore, without showing any PTO policies to the contrary,
IFF could not be allowed registration of its "phantom" marks, and thus it
could not demonstrate that it was discriminated against by the PTO.
In reaching its conclusions regarding IFF's assertion that it was denied
equal protection, the court relied on its decision in In re Loew's Theatres,
Inc.62 In that case, the applicant claimed that its mark was not fairly
considered by the Board, and cited another case decided by the Supreme
Court on the issue of geographic misdescriptiveness 3 The court rejected
this assertion, stating that "each application for registration of a mark for
particular goods must be separately evaluated."" Therefore, even if another
similar mark had been granted registration in a previous instance, it would
not grant IFF an automatic right to the registration of its own marks. The
court further stated that the Board has the discretion to review each mark on
its own merits, and may require any additional information it wishes to
review when making its decision. Therefore, while IFF contends that other
similar marks have been granted registration by the PTO, it is within the
Board's discretion to consider the mark on its own merits. Thus, as 1FF
offered no proof of prior PTO registrations of "phantom" marks, the
Board's decision to deny the marks did not serve to discriminate against IFF
or deny it equal protection under the court's assessment of IFF's ability to
register its marks.
What about the contention, outlined above, that the court had no valid
reason for requiring IFF to register each of its marks on a separate
application? If that is the case, would the court's holding not serve to deny
IFF its rights to not have its property taken without due process of law
under the Constitution? The court contends that since the Board published
6 Id
61 International Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314,1317 (May 19,1998) (thepublished
opinion of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, rejecting Appellant's trademark application).
62 In reLoew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 226 U.S.P.Q. 865 (Fed. Cir.1985) (sustaining the Board's
holding that the name 'Durango" used on a chewing tobacco would be primarily geographically
misdescriptive, and thus could not be registered under the Lanham Act as a trademark for chewing
tobacco).
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its opinions and provided IFF with every opportunity to contest its findings,
the decision was in accordance with due process. 66 However, if the Board's
reasoning was flawed, and there was no real reason for requiring IFF to
register each mark separately, the Board would be asking IFF to contest its
findings based on the wrong set of facts. In this situation, IFF was required
to contest the Board's findings that IFF's proposed "phantom" marks would
cause future searchers to hunt for infinite permutations of the mark, and
thus violated the policy of providing a reliable and clear record for
searching. 6 It further required IFF to contest the finding that its drawings
violated the drawing requirements for registration.' While the Board's
findings on these points are true and thus wholly incontestable, they are not
the basis on which the issue should have been decided.
IFF should have contested the Board's findings on the basis that "LIVING
XXXX FLAVOR" is a valid trademark in itself for IFF's products, regardless
of the particular flavor that is to be listed in the mark. As discussed above,
the particular flavor is inconsequential to recognition of the mark in
commerce, and thus should not have been the issue on which the Board's
decision was based. In addition, the Board's focus on the indefinite number
of permutations that would have to be searched in the future clouded a
correct view of the drawing requirement that would have allowed the
"LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" framework to serve as the entire mark, as
depicted on the drawing submitted with the application. Does this create an
issue of a lost property right if IFF does not have the resources to comply
with the court's findings?
If, for example, a competitor, HFF from the previous example, decided
to use the "Living Garlic Flavor" mark in another part of the country, it
could do so provided it did not have any knowledge of IFF's use of the mark
(and no constructive knowledge, since IFF's "LIVING" mark was not
granted federal registration by the PTO). If IFF later sought to expand to
other parts of the country, it would be prevented from using the mark where
HFF had already established use, even though HFF began to use it after IFF
had begun use elsewhere in the country. Therefore, in that situation, IFF
would have been denied the rights, privileges, and profits that it would have
received from expansion into the new market if the court had properly
" International Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368.
67 Id at 1367-1368.
" Id at 1364.
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granted it federal registration of its mark. While due process may have been
followed, the end result is that IFF was denied the benefits of its hard work
and creativity, simply because the court employed a skewed notion of what
constitutes a fully compliant trademark application, and sought to avoid
burdening others with searching through infinite permutations of
trademarks. Clearly, such a search would effectively end at the first
"LIVING" mark, since all subsequent permutations would be substantially
similar and thus not available for use by future applicants.
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND SENSIBLE LAW
While this Note primarily concerns a single case and the implications of
the Lanham Act on the activities of a single corporation, the decision voiced
by the Federal Circuit has a far more extensive reach than may at first be
visible. The decision is more than just a following of statutory law. It is one
in which the court has turned a blind eye to what makes sense and has
simply hidden behind the statute. Clearly, the law in the United States
functions by relying on statutory mandates as clear guidance when choosing
any legal course of action, and relying on established precedent when the
statutes fail to specifically address the situation. In the IFF decision,
however, the situation was one in which the statute clearly addressed the
matter at hand, yet failed to deliver a sound answer for the party most
affected by it.
There is no doubt that the PTO examining attorney, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed
the accepted mandates of the Lanham Act when making their decisions in
the International Flavors and Fragrances case. 69 In the vast majority of cases,
this would be the end of the story. In the IFF case, however, the court was
faced with a challenge in which it could enter a ruling based entirely on the
statute (which it did), or could look at the law as a whole and consider what
the law seeks to accomplish when making its decision. The PTO and the
Court of Appeals failed in their respective duties to apply the best overall
interpretation of the law, and the result was the deprivation of IFF's rights
in its property.
0 Id at 1361.
[Vol. 8:53
18
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol8/iss1/3
PHANTOM TRADEMARKS
A reasonable search of the relevant law reveals a number of court
decisions that voice an opinion based on the law as it reads in the books, but
that also question the soundness of that statute or precedent. These courts
leave their concerns skillfully woven throughout their opinions, and subtly
yet clearly sound a call to legislators. The purpose of these decisions is to
encourage lawmakers to make a change in the existing law that may close an
unintended loop or smooth a dangerous rough edge. Additionally, as would
have been most desirable in the IFF decision, it may suggest a change in a law
that may make sense in its individual parts, but that fails to do so when taken
as a whole. The IFF situation was ripe to make such a statement to
Congress, but the Court of Appeals failed to hear the call, and has thus failed
to remedy a problem that will surely continue into the future.
The problem presented and discussed in the foregoing pages resulted from
the court following the strict letter of the Lanham Act. The PTO and the
court overlooked the most sensible solution to IFF's problem, a problem
that will surely be encountered by countless future would-be applicants that
manufacture a variety of products under a common standard logo. IFF
sought to register an unknown number of marks by means of three standard
applications that simply depicted a variable, generic component as "XXXX"
in the application, and a drawing that included depictions of the mark as it
would be seen in commerce.'0 When making their decisions, the PTO and
the Court of Appeals followed two primary standards under the trademark
laws. First, they only looked as far as the letter of the Lanham Act, and
stated that the "one mark per application" rule was to be strictly followed."1
While it is clear that the course of action attempted by 1FF violated this
standard, the inquiry must not end here.
The second standard that the PTO and the court applied in their decisions
was the "likelihood of confusion" test. 2 This test asks if a consumer in the
marketplace would be confused into thinking that a product was made by
the original owner of a trademark when it was actually made by a subsequent
manufacturer who used a "confusingly similar" trademark."3 Using this test,
the court noted that if IFF were allowed to register its marks using the
"XXXX" notation in the applications, it could serve as a bar to future
' International Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314.
71 ld
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registrations by any other manufacturer that wished to register a mark using
the name of a plant, herb, fruit or vegetable, as IFF could claim that it
somehow owned the right to the trademarks for all such products.74 This
could thereby create concerns as to future applications when determining
whether newly proposed marks would be confused with IFF's would-be
marks, as there would not be a full set of specific marks for purposes of this
comparison. Therefore, under the court's reasoning, allowing IFF to register
its marks would be unduly burdensome on all future applicants, and thus IFF
could not be permitted to register its marks.
Following this standard of trademark law, it is clearly arguable that
allowing IFF's registrations could cause problems for other would-be
registrants. The problem here, however, lies somewhere between the
primary lines of reasoning employed by the court, in a place where they
should come together. That gray area is where the essence of IFF's quandary
can be seen most clearly.
The court has essentially informed IFF of two problems that obstruct its
road to registration: (1) IFF must register each mark individually, and (2)
IFF's blanket use of the names of herbs, flowers, fruits, and vegetables in its
applications will-cause problems of confusion for future registrants." While
these contentions may seem facially acceptable, they reveal the problem with
this decision when taken together. For the sake of clarity, the second
contention will be addressed first.
The court in this case employed a "likelihood of confusion" analysis
when making its decision, resulting in a determination that the "LIVING
XXXX FLAVOR" framework, if allowed to be registered, would cause
problems for subsequent registrants with similar marks.76 This type of
analysis is found in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
h li2 at 1364.
7' Id. at 1361.
' Id at 1368.
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in LP. Lund TradingApS and Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co. and Robern, Inc.7 The
court in that case
[I]dentified eight factors to be weighed in determining
likelihood of confusion:
(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the
goods; (3) the relationship between the parties' channels of
trade; (4) the relationship between the parties' advertising;
(5) the classes of prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of
actual confusion; (7) the defendant's intent in adopting its
mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff's mark. 8
The court stated that no single factor is necessarily determinative, but each
must be considered.79 Furthermore, the court noted that the first factor,
similarity, must be considered on the basis of the total effect of the mark,
rather than on the individual features.8'
When applied to the IFF case, the parameters set forth in Kohler show
that IFF's marks pass the likelihood-of-confusion test in a way that would
likely prevent other manufacturers from using similar marks. The marks
pass the test not for the reasons that the court promotes, but for the reason
that they are clear marks, used in a particular commercial setting, and cannot
be used by another without risking infringement. Consider, for example, a
hypothetical situation in which IFF has been permitted to register the mark
"LIVING CITRUS FLAVOR," and another party is seeking to register a
similar mark, "LIVING CITRUS ESSENCE." Based on the standard
considerations set out in Kohler, the new mark would likely be denied. The
" 163 F.3d 27,49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (1st Cir. 1998). In that case, Lund, a faucet manufacturer,
brought an action against Kohler Company and Robern, Inc., its competitors, for trademark dilution and
infringement of its trade dress. Defendants allegedly copied a faucet produced by Plaintiff which Plaintiff
claimed had acquired secondary meaning. The draw to this particular faucet was found in its unique
design as a type of waterfall to be mounted on a wall. The faucet had been displayed in the Museum of
Modern Art, and thus Kohler hoped to find favor with those who enjoyed a certain artistic flair in their
kitchens and bathrooms, by marketing a faucet that was similar but did not actually copy the Plaintiff's
design. The court found no actual confusion on the part of consumers, but found that under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, where no confusion need be shown, Plaintiff's faucet was famous and
thus diluted by the Kohler faucet.
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marks are certainly similar; the goods would be necessarily similar; the
channels of trade would be similar, and, of course, the classes of prospective
purchasers would also be the same or similar. Without even considering the
remaining factors, it is clear that the second mark would likely fail under a
test of likelihood of confusion. Furthermore, as the "LIVING XXXX
FLAVOR" framework is equally limited to IFF's particular product and
industry, it should have been granted registration as requested. Therefore,
under these standards, IFF's mark is clearly limited to use for specific
products in a specific industry. Thus, the court's contention that the mark
was not clear enough in the application to pinpoint IFF's claim and avoid
future issues concerning confusion and search problems was unfounded.
Clearly, the court was mistaken in its consideration of the possible
implications of IFF's mark when rendering its decision.
Additional evidence in support of these contentions is found in the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Frehling Enters.,
Inc. v. International Select Group, Inc.81 The court there relied heavily on the
fact that the plaintiff's mark had not been used by third parties, a distinction
that added to its strength by showing that the mark was more distinctive and
therefore more easily recognized by consumers. The court then continued
in its analysis by comparing the marks in terms of the overall impression
they created, including the sound, appearance, and manner in which they
were used, and noted that, "The underlying purpose in considering the
similarity of marks as an indicator of likelihood of confusion is that the
closer the marks are, the more likely reasonable consumers will mistake the
source of the product that each mark represents. The probability of this
potential confusion is the touchstone." 2 Perhaps the most telling aspect of
this decision is the subject matter itself. Defendant's "BELL' OGGETTI"
mark infringed the plaintiff's "OGGETTI" mark. The court noted that the
dominant focus of the mark was the word "OGGETTI," even though the
defendant styled its use of the mark somewhat differently from the plaintiff's
81192 F.3d 1330,52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1447 (1 lth Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2216 (2000). In that case,
the plaintiff, a seller of high-end decorative accessories and furniture, brought an action alleging that its
"OGGETTI" service mark was infringed and diluted by the defendant's use of its "BELL' OGETTI
trademark for ready-to-assemble furniture for use with electronic equipment. In reversing the decision
of the district court, the court held that plaintiff had established the likelihood of confusion resulting from
defendant's use of its mark.
a IR at 1337.
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styling."3 Clearly, a dominant and unique word or phrase serves as the
distinctive cornerstone of a mark, and thus another's use of that aspect of the
mark will result in denial of registration or an action for infringement.
As this decision reveals, IFF should have prevailed in its quest to register
its "LIVING" line of trademarks. IFF's proposed marks were well suited to
its products, and they contained sufficiently unique words so that any future
use of a similar mark with those key terms to represent similar products
would be subject to an action for infringement. Therefore, the distinctiveness
of a trademark is based both on its overall impression and form but is also
based on the use of certain sub-parts that can offer a separate standard of
uniqueness. Thus, whether taken with the "XXXX" portions replaced with
the names of particular fragrances or taken as the "LIVING XXXX
FLAVOR," "LIVING XXXX," and "LIVING XXXX FLAVORS"
frameworks, IFF's proposed marks pass the many tests of the circuit courts
for distinctiveness and ability to be protected. All future tests in actions by
IFF against subsequent registrants would likely also pass muster, and thus the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should have permitted its request
for registration. Each part of the court's ruling, when taken separately from
the others, fails for simple lack of reason. Moreover, when taken as a whole,
the court's decision amounts to clear error in its reasoning, and thus should
have been decided in the alternative.
An additional component may be added to IFF's arsenal when
confronting the court's denial of its claim based on likelihood of confusion.
This component accounts for the manner in which a court may look at two
marks when comparing them to decide whether a likelihood of confusion
exists. This method is explained by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.4 The court in
that case addressed the method for testing the degree of similarity between
marks, when the marks are to be scrutinized for the likelihood of confusion
13 Id
8 King of the Mt. Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1999).
In King of the Mt. Sports, the plaintiff, a retailer of outdoor apparel brought a trademark infringement and
dilution action against the defendant for its promotion of the "Jeep King of the Mountain Downhill
Series," a downhill skiing event, which allegedly infringed on the plaintiff's "King of the Mountain mark"
as used on its outdoor apparel. While the plaintiff's use of its trademark centered on products for hunters,
fishermen, and other types of outdoorsmen, the plaintiff contended that skiing and snowboarding were
logical extensions of its business and use of its mark, and thus the defendant had infringed by using the
mark for its sporting event.
2000]
23
Carlson: Phantom Trademarks: Good Law or Chain Rattling? The Negative Effe
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2000
. INTELL. PROP. L.
between them. The court stated that the degree of similarity between marks
is tested on three levels: sight, sound, and meaning. According to the court,
these factors are not considered in isolation, but rather "in the context of the
marks as a whole as they are encountered by consumers in the
marketplace.""s There is no side-by-side comparison conducted between the
two marks, but rather the court is required to decide whether the alleged
infringing mark will be confusing to the public as it stands on its own,
outside the presence of the primary mark. The court additionally noted that
the similarities between the two marks are given more weight than the
differences.
This method of reasoning weighs heavily in IFF's favor with regard to the
comparison of its "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" and other marks with other
potentially registered marks. Future registrants would be required to let
their marks stand alone, under the sight, sound, and meaning test employed
in King of the Mountain. Any mark that is similar to IFF's marks in any of
these ways would be similar regardless of the type of flavor or fragrance used
in the standard framework. Furthermore, the meaning of the future mark
would most likely be similar to IFF's marks since its marks are specific to its
products, namely flavor and fragrance oils. Therefore, since future marks
would not likely pass this test, this demonstrates yet another situation
showing that IFF's applications should have been accepted.
The court essentially painted itself into a comer by stating that the
registration of individual marks with specific herb, flower, fruit, and
vegetable names on each would be allowed, relying on a future likelihood of
confusion analysis to support its decision to reject IFF's applications. If the
court wanted the likelihood of confusion reasoning to work in this situation,
it should never have held that individual registrations would be permitted.
However, without finding some type of rationale beyond the basic language
of the statute, it would have had no foundation for denying the registration
of IFF's individual marks. Thus, the court found its rationale in preventing
future confusion and burdens on future registrants. Based on the current
state of affairs resulting from this decision, once IFF registers a single mark,
the chances of future marks being denied registration under a likelihood of
confusion analysis are very high.
" Id at 1090 (quoting Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 913, 916 (10th Cir. 1986)).
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Consider the following explanation: if IFF were to register its "LIVING
ORANGE FLAVOR" mark, as the court seemed to give it permission to do,
any other registrant would be free to use the word "orange" in its
trademarks, as a generic or descriptive term, but would not be permitted to
use the "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" framework for any trademark, as it
would pose a likelihood of confusion. Therefore, the future problems that
IFF could encounter in defending its mark would not revolve at all around
its use of a particular flavor, herb, flower, fruit, or vegetable, but would
revolve around another's attempted use of IFF's "LIVING XXXX
FLAVOR" framework, just as if it were any other owner defending any
other mark. Under this reasoning, the problems that the court alludes to in
denying the registrations are the same problems that any other manufacturer
would encounter and are simply part of the burdens that are incident to the
benefits of trademark ownership. Thus, the contention by the court that it
was somehow preventing future problems was flawed. If such reasoning
were used regularly, it would result in the denial of nearly every application
that came through the PTO, as generic terms could prevent registration of
both similar and dissimilar marks.
Returning to the first issue listed above, the court also based its decision
on the "One Mark Per Application" Rule under the Lanham Act when
requiring IFF to register each one of its marks individually. As IFF is a
producer of a multitude of flavor and fragrance products, registering each of
its products individually as "LIVING ORANGE FLAVOR," "LIVING
ASPARAGUS FLAVOR," "LIVING CHERRY FLAVOR," etc., would
impose a substantial burden on IFF, both in terms of time spent preparing
the applications and the monetary costs involved. Additionally, if each
flavor or fragrance was represented by a different mark, the burden of
defending each separate mark, rather than defending the framework style of
the few marks IFF sought to register, would impose such a substantial
burden on IFF that it may prove to be no longer financially feasible to
obtain and defend its trademarks.
The disturbing aspect of this situation is that the PTO encourages
manufacturers and service providers to federally register their trademarks by
providing statutory remedies beyond those available for common law and
state trademark infringement actions. Nonetheless, even while encouraging
IFF and others to register their trademarks, the PTO and the court have
rendered it nearly impossible for IFF to register its marks by imposing such
burdensome requirements on it to do so. Clearly, the court and the PTO
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have failed in their purpose to aid American industry in its quest to protect
its intellectual property and benefit from the security that is supposed to be
provided under the very law that the court hid behind when deciding the
IFF case.
The end result of these two conflicting issues is that IFF has been told
that it cannot enjoy the benefits of its creativity without jumping through
some very unnecessary and onerous hoops. The bottom line is that IFF
could not register its "framework" trademark for fear that it would cause a
problem of future confusion and impose a nearly impossible task for future
registrants when searching the records for already registered marks. Yet, as
the "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR" framework is the true essence of the mark,
anyone searching for a similar mark would not be burdened at all beyond
finding that one essential mark. As if that were not enough, the court
further held that IFF would have to register these marks under the "One
Mark Per Application" Rule when clearly there is no reason for doing so,
aside from the fact that the Lanham Act requires it. This brings about the
true rub: the PTO and the court have denied IFF the protection that should
be provided under the Lanham Act when there is no practical reason for
doing so, except that the Lanham Act requires it. Does this make sense?
This type of circular reasoning and backwards logic caused IFF to be denied
protection under the laws of the United States and to be put in a position
where it may not be financially able to seek protection in the way the court
seemed to require. Perhaps the most unfortunate result of all was that the
court failed to note the breach in the law that caused it to decide this case as
it did. If the court had done so, its comment could have served as a message
to Congress to pursue future legislation to rectify this situation for future
registrants. As it did not, however, this situation will likely happen again in
the future, as so many American manufacturers will continue to produce
innumerable varieties of their products and seek to protect the intellectual
property resources that are the result of their creativity and the basis of their
future economic growth.
V. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS: THE LAW
AS IT IS AND AS IT SHOULD BE
Consider the following hypothetical situation:
TNT Colorpro, Inc., a small Midwestern manufacturer, manufactures a
variety of paints and colors for use in personal products such as nail enamels
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and hair color. TNT's products are most commonly marketed to the
entertainment industry for use in film-making costumes and special effects,
but the company seeks to enter the broad consumer market with a line of
trendy products geared toward teens. As a relatively small company seeking
to grow, TNT would like to conserve its capital resources by developing one
standard naming scheme for all of its products, rather than each product
having a completely unique name and specialized advertising. Through this
strategy TNT seeks to develop consumer recognition and goodwill toward
its products, with a view toward later expanding its line with new names and
products. After lengthy deliberation and market research, TNT's executives
have chosen the phrase "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" as the basic trademark
framework for its products. Each type of nail enamel and hair color will
have a name such as "Colorpro Mango Explosion," "Colorpro Red Lightning
Explosion," or "Colorpro Blue Tundra Explosion," with the variable name
(the color designation) printed in a way to look as though it was written with
a paintbrush and the framework printed in more muted block lettering.
After the products have been on the market for a chosen period of time,
TNT will analyze which of its colors have been the most popular, and then
register separate trademarks for those names in conjunction with more
specific and direct marketing schemes geared at those products. In this way,
TNT will be able to avoid incurring the expense of individual trademark
registrations until it can be sure the product is a success and will perform in
a way that warrants the expense of protection. Having searched the Patent
and Trademark Office records for similar marks and found none, TNT's
counsel has recommended that it register the mark as "Colorpro XXXX
Explosion," with a disclaimer that TNT claims no rights in the word
"Explosion" except as used with its mark and that the "XXXX" notation is
not part of the mark, but is used in place of the various color names that will
be assigned to each of its products after further development of the colors
and shades that will be offered in its initial product lines.
TNT has submitted an application to the Patent and Trademark Office,
describing the mark "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" with the disclaimer as
written above, and sample labels from product bottles it initially produced
as the required specimens. The mark was initially rejected by the PTO
examiner and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for the same reasons
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that prevented the registration of IFF's mark.86  Claiming that the
application was wrongly rejected, TNT has brought its case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The issue may be decided
one of two ways: it may be decided in the same way as the IFF decision, by
strict construction of the Lanham Act, or it may be considered in light of the
intent of the law, with a result that is formed with common sense and
reason. Consider the following:
A. THE CURRENT LAW: THE TNT DECISION FOLLOWING IN RE
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES, INC. (FF)87
Following the IFF decision, the court here would likely deny TNT's
application, and hold that TNT is seeking to register an unknown number
of "Phantom Trademarks" with a single application, in violation of the "One
Mark Per Application" Rule, and that registration of the mark would impose
an unnecessary burden on future searchers of the trademark registry who
would wish to conduct a search before registering their own marks. While
this holding would certainly adhere to the dictates of the Lanham Act, it
would not make any more sense than it did in the similar situation found in
the IFF case. This decision will force TNT to submit separate registrations
for trademarks for each of its products, which will cause it to incur a
substantial additional expense to protect its marks. As a small company with
limited resources, it may not be financially feasible for TNT to register each
of its marks in this way, thus forcing it to rely on common law trademark
protection. If its marks are later infringed upon by another manufacturer,
TNT will then be forced to incur litigation costs to avoid dilution of its
mark and harm to its goodwill, quality, and customer recognition. TNT will
suffer the deprivation of the nationwide notice of claim to its marks, and
thus it will be forced to endure the resultant losses that could be easily
avoided. This is certainly an unsavory result.
36 See International Flavors & Fragrances, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (May 19, 1998) (the published
opinion of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejecting IFF's application).
" 183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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B. THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE: THE TNT DECISION FOLLOWING A LOGICAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
Now assume the court decided the case differently, with an eye toward
the actual effects of its decision and the most logical result. If this were the
reality, the court would likely grant TNT's application. Such a decision
would account for the fact that the mark "Colorpro XXXX Explosion"
would be discovered in a search of the trademark registry as easily as any
other mark, thus precluding the need for a future searcher to continue to
search out each of the variations that could be created using the standard
framework. Furthermore, simple judicial construction of the Lanham Act's
"One Mark Per Application" rule could allow TNT's mark to be deemed a
single mark, with slight variations allowed as long as they were only
variations of non-protectable color names within the protected mark. This
would be no different than if TNT had registered "Colorpro Explosion" as
its trademark and then labeled each of its products with that mark and with
the color designation printed elsewhere on the package. Clearly the color
name may not be registered separately if it is a generic term anyway, so its
placement within or in proximity to the rest of the mark is merely a matter
of style and has no effect on the stability or use of the trademark in
commerce. In this way, TNT would be permitted to enjoy the benefits of
trademark ownership without incurring additional expense, without being
deprived of any property rights in its creations, and without depriving any
other future manufacturer of the ability to know what marks have been
assumed and which remain available for use. This is clearly the more
desirable and logical result.
C. DOWN THE ROAD: A FINAL HYPOTHETICAL
Considering the foregoing possibilities, how will the results of the court's
decision influence future events? Consider one final situation:
ColorQuick Productions, Inc. (CPI), a small Northwestern manufacturer
of household paints and dyes, seeks to diversify its business and enter the
specialty goods market with a line of paints and hair colors for use in hair
salons and spas. After extensive market research (and assuming they do not
actually discover the products marketed by TNT, as TNT is still a small
Midwestern company even though it markets its products nationwide), CPI
decides that the mark "Colorpro Radiance" will best suit its intentions. The
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subsequent events to be considered depend on how the court decided the
TNT case. Each possibility is considered below.
If the court decides TNT's claim in the same way it decided the IFF
application, there would be no entry for "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" in
the Trademark Registry, and thus no notice given to CPI of TNT's mark.
Therefore CPI's counsel would likely recommend that CPI prepare the
necessary applications to register its mark with the PTO.
After the registration process has begun, the PTO would publish CPI's
proposed mark in the Gazette, and TNT's counsel would see the notice and
immediately notify the PTO and CPI of TNT's objection to the registration,
as it would infringe on its "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" line of products by
creating a strong likelihood of confusion among consumers. TNT would
additionally demand that CPI immediately cease all sales and marketing of
its products under the "Colorpro Radiance" mark. Litigation would likely
ensue, and TNT would be subjected to great expenditures of time and
financial resources to defend its mark. This could cause TNT to lose its
mark if it does not have the resources to defend it in potentially lengthy
litigation, particularly if CPI is a subsidiary of a much larger corporation
with the substantial resources necessary to pursue the matter indefinitely.
Regardless of the outcome, TNT's inability to secure the registration of its
mark under the court's decision would subject it not only to the vigilance
required of all trademark owners, but also the expenses of litigation without
the benefit of the prima facie assumption of ownership that registration
confers.
In addition to the financial consequences to TNT, the non-monetary
results of this decision would also make little sense. Whether the marks were
registered as TNT seeks to register them, using the "Colorpro XXXX
Explosion" framework, or with each product registered with a separate
application and trademark, CPI would be precluded from adopting a similar
mark either way. The mark "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" would present
an equal barrier to subsequent registration as "Colorpro Mango Explosion"
would, or any other mark using the framework. Does it not seem to violate
all standards of judicial economy and minimization of paperwork to require
an elaborate undertaking to accomplish the same goal as a much simpler
process, when the results will be the same?
Now consider the outcome of the same situation if TNT were allowed to
register its mark. When CPI conducts a search of the trademark records, it
would find the mark "Colorpro XXXX Explosion" and would therefore be
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given notice that the mark was already taken. Even though CPI's proposed
mark, "Colorpro Radiance," is not the same as TNT's "Colorpro XXXX
Explosion" mark, it would clearly infringe on it based on a likelihood of
confusion analysis. Additionally, CPI could not use any other marks that
closely resemble TNT's mark, so even if the component of the mark that
indicated the specific color of the product was different from any that TNT
manufactured, the true essence of the mark, found in the "Colorpro"
component, would be infringed upon and thus could not be used. This is
indicative of the fact that, contrary to the reasoning of the IFF court, TNT's
"Colorpro" mark would most likely not need to be registered in each of its
forms to be protected as a trademark.
If CPI were to pursue the mark anyway, it would certainly be denied
registration by the PTO, and if it used the mark in commerce it would be
subject to suit by TNT. Furthermore, TNT would be able to avoid long and
costly litigation by securing an injunction against CPI to prevent it from
using the "Colorpro" mark, since registration confers prima facie ownership
of the mark on the owner.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing hypothetical situations, which seems to be the
more sound decision: one that withholds ownership needlessly and creates
a situation where the potential owner is responsible not only for policing its
mark but also the burden of litigation? Or a decision that confers ownership
on a rightful owner, when no other potential registrant could suffer harm by
the registration, thus eliminating the wasteful litigation that continuously
burdens overcrowded courts? Clearly the latter is the appropriate decision.
As the above examples explain, in the IFF case the court should have ruled
in favor of IFF, a registrant who had a unique mark that would not likely
have caused any practical problems to any other registrants. The "One Mark
Per Application" Rule of the Lanham Act could have easily been read to
avoid the instant problem by regarding IFF's "LIVING XXXX FLAVOR,"
"LIVING XXXX," and "LIVING XXXX FLAVORS" marks as three single
marks, regardless of the minor variations caused by adding generic terms.
The variations that would have been caused by these names would likely
have had no bearing on future searches of the trademark registry, and thus
would have imposed no additional burden on other registrants. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should have allowed the registration of
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IFF's marks, and should reverse its ruling at the next available opportunity.
The reasoning surrounding the court's designation of Phantom Trademarks
is flawed and should be abandoned. While there may be a situation in the
future in which the theory of Phantom Trademarks will be applicable and
useful, the IFF case was not the time for it. The court should have decided
the IFF case in the alternative. The registration should have been granted.
JAmEs E. CARLSON
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